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PREFACE 
This paper on the role of Thomas Woodrow Wilson in 
the American rejection of the League of Nations is an out¬ 
growth of an interest in the Lesgue of Nations. The bulk 
of this work was compiled from the speeches and utterances 
of Woodrow Wilson, Supplementary materials came from con¬ 
temporary writers, cabinet members, congressmen and jour¬ 
nalists of the Wilson Era. 
The author is deeply indebted to the staff of the 
Atlanta University and Atlanta Public Libraries for their 
aid and many courtesies extended during the research period 
of this work. 
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Whenever one encounters any mention of the League of 
Nations, inevitably there is also mention of Woodrow Wilson, 
twenty-eigth President of the United States. Wilson has 
been called the parent of this organization although his own 
country failed to join. The League of Nations was an inter¬ 
national organization that functioned from January 10, 1920 
to April 18, 1914-6. The Covenant of the League of Nations 
appeared as part one of all of the treaties that ended the 
First World War. President Wilson insisted at the Paris 
Peace Conference that the Covenant of the League of Nations 
be included as a part of the treaties. 
The idea of a collective organization was not orig¬ 
inal with Wilson. It had been mentioned by men like the 
1 
abbe de Saint-Pierre and Immanuel Kant. 
Great impetus was given to the idea by the formation 
of several organizations during the First World War which 
dealt primarily with the idea of an organization to enforce 
the peace. The League to Enforce Peace was organized in 
"^Roland N. Stromberg, Collective Security and American 
Foreign Policy: From the League of Nations to NATO (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963), pp. 
1 
2 
America and the League of Nations Commission was organized 
in Great Britain. Many similar groups were started in 
smaller European nations. The foremost idea in Europe was 
to put teeth into the Hague Court system.^ 
President Wilson, in April of 1917» made the last of 
his famous Fourteen Points the creation of a League of 
2 
Nations. These Fourteen Points were said to have later dis¬ 
armed Germany and were used as a basis of the subsequent 
peace negotiations. The idea of using them was not well re¬ 
ceived by David Lloyd George of Great Britain and Georges 
3 
Clemenceau of France, 
Many problems beset the President during the crucial 
postwar peace deliberations; problems which had their roots 
in the clash between Old and New World ideologies. Wilson 
had expected to dominate the peace because we had helped to 
save Europe in the final weeks of the war. 
The problems at home centered around the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. This staid body wanted to share in the 
treaty making as well as the ratification. The committee was 
headed by the Senator from Massachusetts, Henry Cabot Lodge. 
The Republican members were Senators William E. Borah of 
1Ibid., pp. 12-14. 
^U. S., Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 2d Sess., 
1917, LVI, 680^817 
3u. S., Department of State, Papers Relating to The 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918 (Washington: 
Ü. S. Government Printing Office, 1918) Supplement I, 
468-69. 
3 
Idaho, Frank B. Brandegee of Connecticut, Albert B. Fall 
of New Mexico, Philander C. Knox of Pennsylvania, Warren G. 
Harding of Ohio, Hiram W. Johnson of California, Porter J. 
McCumber of North Dakota, George H. Moses of New Hampshire, 
and Harry S. New of Indiana. The Democratic members were 
Senators Gilbert Hitchcock of Nebraska, Key Pittman of 
Nevada, Atlee Pomerene of Ohio, John Knight Shields of 
Tennessee, Hoke Smith of Georgia, Claude A. Swanson of 
Virginia, and John Sharp Williams of Mississippi, Key roles 
were played by the above Senators along with Senator James 
(Jim) Reed of Missouri. 
Many authors make Lodge the sole villain of this 
episode as to why we did not join the League. It is true 
that he was both anti-Wilson and highly partisan, but 
Wilson was anti-Lodge and highly partisan. Lodge was no 
innocent pawn but he did become one of history’s best 
known scapegoats. 
The greatest accusation against Lodge was that he was 
an isolationist but he was no isolated supporter of isola¬ 
tion. The United States had an isolationist tradition 
dating back to the time of George Washington's Farewell 
Address of 1796. We remained isolationist well into the 
twentieth century except for brief forays into the Spanish- 
Americàn War and World War 1.^ During the latter conflict, 
^Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the Ameri¬ 
can People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 195^), 
pp. 615-16. Cited hereafter as Bailey, Diplomatic History. 
we never made an alliance with the enemies of Germany but 
formed an association.'*' 
The isolationist tradition was deeply entrenched in 
2 
the Republican mid-west. These people, logically, chose 
isolationists to represent them in the United States Con¬ 
gress. This isolationist tradition manifested itself in the 
whole treaty and League melee, when many of the Senators sin¬ 
cerely opposed the League because of various degrees of iso¬ 
lationism. 
Another problem fostered by Wilson was the new idea of 
open diplomacy. The idea of open diplomacy brought the Presi¬ 
dent into open conflict with the Old World ideology of secret 
treaties and closed negotiations. However, Wilson failed to 
see that by pushing his new idea the seeds of its own destruc¬ 
tion were being planted. The problem can be stated as follows 
Could he successfully negotiate everything in the open di¬ 
plomatic fashion? 
The other idea brought out by Wilson was the idea of 
collective security. Would collective security run counter 
to the Monroe Doctrine? Would further entanglement in 
European affairs cause Europe to also interfere in American 
^Ibid.. pp. 596-97. 
^Ray A. Billington, "The Origins of Middle-Western 
Isolationiàm," Political Science Quarterly, LX (March, 1945)* 
44-64. 
^Robert H. Ferrell, "Woodrow Wilson and Open Diplomacy, 
in George L. Anderson (ed.), Issues and Conflicts. (Lawrence: 
University of Kansas Press, 1959), PP» 193-208. 
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affairs? The fears raised by these questions caused collec¬ 
tive security to become a foremost controversial point. The 
trouble fostered by Wilson became apparent when the idea of 
collective security moved from a Wilsonian ideal to a forma¬ 
tive item in the covenant.^- Results suggested that America 
was not ready for collective security. 
That Wilson was the primary reason for the American 
rejection of the League of Nations forms a central theme of 
this paper. In being extremely idealistic, Messianic and 
controversial, he forgot that all men are fallible. His per¬ 
sonality, illness, and even his second marriage cast many 
shadows on his motives and clarity of vision. It was poli¬ 
tically unrealistic to refuse to compromise. A partial com¬ 
promise is often worse than no compromise. The ratification 
of the League Covenant was worth the compromise in spite of 
the other motives. It was unsound to stake all on a pathetic 
faith in Article X. These problems will be analyzed in depth. 
Another complicating factor involved in the failure of 
the Senate to ratify the treaty might be found in the fact 
that for a period of time we had a woman regent. This his¬ 
torical oddity could have been the straw that broke the back 
of Wilson's fight with the Senate. We had never had a woman 
hold a similar position in the history of our country. The 
President's mental processes might have deteriorated during 
^-Roland N. Stromberg, ”The Riddle of Collective 
Security, 1916-1920,” ibid., pp. 11+7-69. 
6 
this time even if it was denied by his personal physician.1 
The lack of confidence in the Secretary of State and the 
2 
Wilson - House break were significant. 
Wilson’s role in subsequent years can only be ascer¬ 
tained by becoming familiar with his personality and in¬ 
fluences which helped to shape his formative years. Wilson 
was born in Staunton, Virginia in 1856. At a very early age, 
the family moved to Augusta, Georgia where the father took 
over the duties of minister of the First Presbyterian Church. 
The first memories of Wilson were of seeing the South trying 
3 
to recuperate from the throes of the Civil War. Close 
proximity to the monstrousness of war made him a pacifist. 
Pacifism caused Wilson to embark upon a road of neutrality 
h. 
during World War I, 
Wilson’s attempt to steer America clear of the war in 
Europe and remain isolated proved unworkable. He once de¬ 
clared that the war in Europe was "a war with which we have 
Cary T. Grayson, Woodrow Wilson; An Intimate Memoir 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1959), pp. 21I4- 
16. 
2 
John M. Blum, Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflir. Co., 19^1 )* pp. 21J+-16. 
•^Ray S tanna rd Baker, Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters 
(8 vols.; Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 
1927), I, 28-55. Cited hereafter as Baker, Life and Letters. 
^William Allen White, Woodrow Wilson: The Man, His 
Times, and His Task (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 19247, 
pp. 50-65* 
7 
nothing to do, whose causes cannot touch us."^ In his opin¬ 
ion, it was a conflict which "looked like a natural raking 
out of the pent-up jealousies and rivalries of the eomplicat- 
2 
ed politics of Europe." 
Wilson, The Man 
Woodrow Wilson, as he began to call himself, inherited 
everlasting qualities from his Scottish Presbyterian parents. 
His father was handsome, vigorous, sharp of tongue and a 
lover of right. The father and mother came from noted in¬ 
tellectual families.^ They instilled in Wilson an "immovable 
faith in God" and a sense of responsibility only to his Lord 
and maker 
Wilson was influenced by the great intellectual zeal 
of the British. He read the debates of the British House 
of Commons and the Edinburg Review and became obsessed with 
£ 
the idea of becoming a great parliamentarian. In his senior 
year at Princeton, he published "Cabinet Government in the 
United States" in the International Review. As a joke he 
^"Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd (eds.), The 
Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson (6 vols.; New York: Harper 
& Brothers, 1925-1927), I, 157-59. Cited hereafter as Baker 
and Dodd, Public Papers. 
2Ibld., I, 527. 
^Baker, Life and Letters, I, 247-325. 
^Herbert, C. F. Bell, Woodrow Wilson and The People 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1945), p. 9. 
^Baker, Life and Letters, I, 90-98. 
8 
even had some cards inscribed, "Thomas Woodrow Wilson, 
Senator from Virginia."^ Wilson entered the University of 
2 
Virginia Law School to eventually get into politics, 
Wilson inherited from his southern background a strong 
attachment for the Democratic Party, southern style conserva¬ 
tism, state rights, a love for politics and a tendency toward 
3 
impassioned rhetoric. His conservative views can be cited 
time after time in his early writing.^- This is especially 
true of his Ph.D. thesis at Johns Hopkins entitled, "Con¬ 
gressional Government." This was later expanded into a 
£ 
book. Wilson enjoyed the University although he complained 
about the "cut and dried" courses.^ His intellectual prowess 
was demonstrated on the faculties of Bryn Mawr, Wesleyan and 
7 
Princeton. 
These influences contributed to the molding of the per¬ 
sonality of Wilson. His southern heritage led him to choose 
Ellen Axson, from a family of Georgia Presbyterians, as his 
1Ibid.. p. 104. 
^Eleanor Wilson McAdoo, The Priceless Gift (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Co., Inc., 195D, p. 31. 
3 
White, op.cit., p. 55. 
^Woodrow Wilson, Mere Llterat 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 189b 
and Other Essays 
. 1-49. 
^Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government: A Study in 
American Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908), 
pp. 1-75. 
^Baker, Life and Letters, I, 182. 
7Ibid., pp. 247-325. 
1 
This marriage, in the tradi- sweetheart and later his wife. 
tional southern fashion, was romantic, warm, affectionate, 
mutually stimulating and enriched by many visits from rela- 
2 
tives. He once told his wife that, "My salvation is in 
3 
being loved." His British intellectual sense was even en¬ 
riched by a visit to Glasgow, Scotland and Oxford, England 
at the insistence of his wife.^ 
Wilsonian rhetoric was at its peak when he talked his 
way to the Presidency of Princeton in 1902. He had been 
nominated for the job after delivering an impressive speech 
at the ceremony changing the name of the school from the 
College of New Jersey to Princeton. This selection of Wilson 
was due to the fact that there was a vacancy and they needed 
a good leader. 
The only defeat suffered at Princeton was in the 
skirmish with Dean Andrew F. West over the possible location 
of the new Graduate School. Wilson took this defeat because 
as one author has so aptly put it, he had seen "the road to 
the White House."^ 
^Ibld., p. 159. 
p 
Arthur Walworth, Woodrow Wilson (2 vols.j London: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1958), I* 70-78. 
O 
■^Baker, Life and Letters, I, 166. 
^Tbld.. II, 75-85. 
'’Baker and Dodd, Public Papers, I, 259-85. 
Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The Road to the White House 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948)» pp. 99-102. 
10 
Wilson's speeches began to catch fire in 1910 and this 
led to an offer to run for the Governorship of New Jersey. 
The offer was made by the astute party machine man, Colonel 
George Harvey who convinced James Smith, Jr., boss apparent 
of New Jersey, that Wilson was the man of the hour.'*' The 
campaign was long and hardfought and brought national atten¬ 
tion to Wilson. Wilson was elected and carried with him a 
Democratic majority into the lower house of a firmly Republi- 
2 
can legislature. 
From this point on, one sees Wilson, the opportunist. 
The unprecedented rapidity with which Wilson moved from the 
Governorship of New Jersey in 1910 to the White House in 
1912 is unheralded in the annals of our country's history. 
This move was carefully formulated and perfectly executed. 
He was popular, attuned to the public ear, and correctly 
3 
gauged the vote-getting potential of Progressivism, 
The fact that Wilson was ’’stubborn, often passionate, 
vindictive, intuitive and flowery in language”^ might be 
attributed to constant association with doting female re¬ 
lations. Wilson seemed to have been ruled by "intuition 
^Walworth, op.clt., I, 1^3-56. 
2 
Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive 
Era. 1910-1917 (New York:' Harper & brothers, 19j?4-), p. 10. 
Cited hereafter as Link, Progressive Era. 
3Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
^■George S. Viereck, The Strangest Friendship in His¬ 
tory: Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House (New York: Llveright. 
Inc., 1932), p. 2Ü0. 
11 
rather than by reason...in fact, arguments, however, soundly 
reasoned...were out...if they did not fit his intuitive 
sense.This association with females led him to depend on 
his wives more than anyone except Colonel Edward Mandell 
p 
House, a Texan, who was associated with Wilson for almost 
3 
two presidential terms. They became associated during the 
campaign of 1912 and House remained an intimate advisor to 
Wilson. Perhaps, Wilson had at last found a masculine image 
with which he could identify. The two exchanged mountains of 
correspondence that even became affectionate to a point. 
The European Horizon Darkens 
When the President first assumed office, there was a 
preoccupation with domestic matters. Industrial and agricul¬ 
tural reforms were sorely needed.^" The guidelines were not 
established until after he took office; therefore, he needed 
5 
nothing to complicate matters. 
The first complication was the prelude of the war in 
Europe. The ominous clouds were beginning to form. Very 
^Earl Latham (ed.), The Philosophy and Politics of 
Woodrow Wilson (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 195>8), 
pp. 9-10. 
p 
Link, Progressive Era, p. 208. 
-^Baker, Life and Letters. Ill, l5J^-55« 
^Tariff, Federal Reserve System, Farm Credit and 
Trust Regulation. 
'’Walter Lippmann, Drift and Mastery (New York: Prentice- 
Hall, Inc., 1961), pp. 82-ti5. 
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early, Wilson was faced with the possibility of America’s 
involvement and tried to remain aloof.^ He sent Colonel 
House to Germany to ascertain the severity of the situation. 
House visited Prance and England and returned with a report 
2 
for the President. Meanwhile, the Austrian Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand had been assassinated in Sarajevo and plunged 
Europe into war. News of the war came to America in late 
3 
July and early August. 
As if the war was not enough, Wilson lost his wife to 
Bright’s disease. This was enough to shake even the most 
rock-ribbed of personalities.^ During the very trying time 
that followed, the President was surrounded by William Gibbs 
McAdoo, his southern son-in-law and United States Secretary 
of the Treasury; William Jennings Bryan, his neutrality 
loving Secretary of State; and Colonel House, his personal 
advisor and alter ego. 
After the resignation of Bryan, the appointment of 
Robert Lansing took place; however, Colonel House con¬ 
tinued to exert the greatest influence on the President. 
Colonel House had always been sympathetic with the allied 
cause and began to feel more and more that the United 
^Baker, Life and Letters, V, 2-3* 
^Link, Progressive Era, p. 208. 
^Baker, Life and Letters, V, 2-3* 
^Walworth, op.clt., I, 400* 
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States would be drawn into the war.^ 
Against the wishes of many of his intimates the Presi¬ 
dent courted and married Mrs. Edith Bolling Galt. As Mrs. 
Wilson, she played a dominant role in the life of the Presi- 
2 
dent until his demise. 
The chief reason for Bryan’s resignation as Secretary 
of State was that Wilson's idea of neutrality and his were 
dissimiliar. To Bryan, the idea of neutrality was complete 
isolation from European affairs. This meant no sympathetic 
overtones. Wilson’s idealistic form of neutrality was iso¬ 
lation as a means to negotiate a peace. He felt that if 
3 
America could remain neutral he could work out a peace. 
The announcement of submarine warfare against the Allies by 
the Germans however, changed the whole complexion of the war 
k 
and spurred the preparedness movement. 
The opportunist Wilson sprang into action in 1915 in 
preparation for his renomination in 1916, He fought for the 
confirmation of Louis D. Brandeis, a Jew, to the bench of 
$ 
the United States Supreme Court. The President was re¬ 
nominated by acclamation because "he kept us out of war.” 
^"Baker, Life and Letters. V, 362. 
p 
Link, Progressive Era, p. 208. 
•^Merle Eugene Curti, "Bryan and World Pesce," Smith 
College Studies in History, XVI (April-July, 1931)* 191-93* 
^Baker, Life and Letters. V, 330-31* 
^Alpheus, T. Mason, Brandeis. A Free Man’s Life (New 
York: Viking Press, 191^6), pp. 70-o0. 
This bothered Wilson and he said, "I can't keep the country 
out of war. They talk of me as though I were a god.”'*’ 
In January, 1917* the President called for "peace with¬ 
out victory...because only...a...peace between equals...could 
p 
endure." The German reply was a statement of war aims and 
an announcement of unrestricted warfare. Diplomatic re¬ 
lations were severed on February 3 and a declaration of war 
was requested on April 2. His speech was unparalled and not 
"ghost written". He said: 
.... Fight for the things which we have always carried 
nearest our hearts, for democracy, for the right of 
those who submit to authority to have a voice in their 
own governments.. .and make the world itself at last 
free.... America is privileged to spend her blood and 
her might for the principles that gave birth and happi¬ 
ness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping 
her, she can do no other.^ 
Congress, on April 6, after four days debate declared 
war. Even ex-President Theodore Roosevelt was in favor of 
war, although six in the Senate and fifty in the House voted 
against the declaration.^ 
As soon as we had entered the war as an Associate power 
rather than as an Allied power, Wilson set in motion the 
machinery for establishing the peace. His board of private 
citizens known as the "Inquiry Committee" was established. 
^Baker, Life and Letters, VI, 258. 
p 
U. S. Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 2d Sess., 
1917, LIV, 1741-43. 
3Ibid., 65th Cong., 1st Sess., 1917, LV, 102-104. 
k Ibid., p. 213. 
15 
Many meiribers of this board attended the Peace Conference 
later with the President and in many instances published 
works about the Wilson Era. The board included Colonel 
House; Walter Lippmann, Editor of the New Republic; Dr. 
Isiah Bowman, President of the American Geographical 
Society; George Louis Beer, an expert on colonial questions; 
and David Hunter Miller, who helped to draft the Covenant 
of the League of Nations. These men worked on many questions 
that might be discussed in the event that peace negotiations 
should start.^ 
These opening paragraphs were designed to acquaint the 
reader with Wilson as a man, a President of the United States, 
and the problems he faced. The unprecedented rise of the man 
to the highest office in the land was unparallel in our coun¬ 
try’s history and the problems that periled him were mammoth. 
The major problem was whether or not to get involved 
in a European war. The answer for Wilson was in the affirma¬ 
tive but he never forsook his role as peacemaker. Wilson, 
the idealist, had frowned upon American participation over 
2 
the sinking of the Lusitania, However, this same Wilson 
was not opposed to making the "world safe for Democracy." 
The revivalist fervor that Wilson had used to whip 
■^Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace 
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1944)» p. 110. Cited hereafter as 
Bailey, Lost Peace. 
p 
Oscar Handlln, Chance or Destiny (Boston: Little, 
Brown & Co., Inc., 1954)» pp. 160-65. 
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the American citizenry into a frenzy over participation In 
war was to prove the seeds of his own destruction. The war 
unleashed the normal restraints of the isolationists and 
middle class Americans into the highest prejudices and 
hatreds that our country has ever seen.^ 
■^George Creel, Rebel at Large (New Yorkî G. P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1947)» pp. 198-99* 
CHAPTER II 
PRELUDE TO THE LEAGUE 
Enumeration of Fourteen Points 
When the Interallied Conference failed to reach an 
agreement on the formulation of war aims, Wilson prepared 
his now famous Fourteen Points. The Fourteen Points were 
based on a report prepared by the Inquiry.'*’ 
Wilson enumerated his famous idealistic list of prin¬ 
ciples In an address before the Senate of the United States 
on January 8, 1918. The Fourteen Points called for: 
1. Open covenants of peace.... 
2. Free navigation of the seas.... 
3. Equality of trade...among nations.... 
[j.. Armaments will be reduced,... 
b. Impartial adjustment of colonial claims..,. 
6. Evacuation of Russian Territory.... 
7. Belgium...evacuated and restored.... 
8. French territory...freed.... 
9* Readjustment of frontiers of Italy.... 
10. Austria - Hungary...autonomous development.... 
11. Integrity of...Balkan states.... 
12. Turkish (give up) parts of Ottoman Empire.... 
13. Independent Polish state.... 
1ÏÏ.. A general association of nations must be formed 
under specific covenants for the purpose of.... 
Political Independence and territorial Integrity to 
great and small states alike.2 
^Bell, on.clt.. p. 2i|4. 
p 
^U. S. Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 2d Sess., 
1918, LVI, 68ïïTHn 
17 
18 
The most discussed of the Fourteen Points was the last 
(H4.) which provided for the creation of a League of Nations. 
The Fourteen Points were vague enough to be interpreted by 
everyone and idealistic enough to be sloganized. 
The idea for a League of Nations or association was not 
an original idea with Wilson and had even been tried before. 
The Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration had been established 
in 1899 with the end of the Spanish-American War, with a 
great deal of American diplomacy.^ Theodore Roosevelt won 
a Nobel Peace Prize in 1906 for his mediation of the Russo- 
Japanese War and his acceptance address included the thesis 
2 
which proposed a League of Nations. William Howard Taft 
had helped and been very active with the League To Enforce 
Peace. Taft felt that an organization was needed that would 
3 
use force to maintain security against aggression. 
Wilson's idea for a League of Nations was revolutionary 
in that it differed from the above plans. The central idea 
in his plan was the elimination or nullifying of the old 
balances of power in Europe. The reaction throughout the 
world was electrifying to Wilson. According to one author, 
Wilson's Points were too ideal and too vague but they 
raised the Messianic hopes of Wilson and soon, he too, 
^"Bailey, Diplomatic History, p. 483» 
2Ibld., p. 519 
^League To Enforce Peace, League To Enforce Peace, 
The American Branch (New York: League To Enforce Peace, 
1915), p. l£. 
19 
believed that he was the Messiah of peace. 
After presentation to Congress, a semi-official in- 
2 
terpretation was prepared. Under the direction of Colonel 
House, the interpretation was prepared by Prank Cobb, of 
3 
the New York World, and Walter Lippmann. The President 
elaborated on this interpretation with supplementary speeches. 
Some sixty million pamphlets, booklets and leaflets were 
distributed to the world, propagandizing the Fourteen Points.^" 
The result of this propaganda program was that the Fourteen 
Points assumed a bargaining position at the conference table. 
At the Metropolitan Opera House in New York on Septem¬ 
ber 27, 1918, Wilson said: 
If it be in deed and in truth, the common object of the 
Governments associated against Germany...to achieve... 
a secure and lasting peace...all who sit down at the 
peace table...shall...pay the price.... That price is 
impartial justice and...a League of Nations formed under 
covenants...S 
The old speech-maker was at it again, his catchy phrases 
caused the world to notice his Fourteen Points. The Four¬ 
teen Points were even noticed in Germany. 
^Bailey, Lost Peace, pp. 26-29. 
p 
Charles Seymour (ed.), The Intimate Papers of Colonel 
House (4 vols.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin 60., 192b-Ï9Bd), 
IV, 154. 
■3 
•'GJ. S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the 
Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 
1914-1920 (2 vols.; Washington: State Department Bulletin, 
1939-19l+0), II, 405-20. 
^George Creel, How We Advertised America (New York: 
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1920), pp. 283-300. 
^Baker and Dodd, Public Papers, V, 240-41. 
20 
Prince Maximillian of Baden, German Chancellor, sent 
a note to President Wilson, by way of the Swiss, asking for 
1 
peace negotiations in response to Wilson's speech. The note 
not only proposed peace but asked that the Germans be allowed 
to retreat. The idea was assailed by Senator Lodge in the 
2 
United States Senate. 
With the aid of Colonel House, Wilson replied to the 
German note on October 8, 1918, promising to negotiate on 
3 
the basis of the Fourteen Points. Comment in the American 
press was generally favorably but not enthusiastic about the 
answer.^- Wilson assembled what he felt was a just answer 
and presentation of the American point of view and sent 
Colonel House to Europe. He was to represent the President 
5 
on the Supreme War Council at Versailles. He arrived in 
Europe on October 26, 1918. 
The idea of the League of Nations was a good one but 
it raised a number of significant questionsî Could a Europe 
so dismembered by the horrors of war forgive and forget 
national interests? Could they not think of a balance of 
power? America was three thousand miles away but what of 
these people? The noblest ideas of many in the past have 
^New York Times, October 7» 1918, p. 1. 
^Ibld., October 8, 1918, p. 1. 
^Seymour, op.clt., IV, 77. 
^New York Times, October 9, 19l8, pp. 1-3. 
-’Seymour, op.cltIV, 87. 
21 
been ground to dust and forgotten because of face to face 
stark reality. This was not an exception. Wilson, in ad¬ 
vocating his Fourteen Points, exhibited the same idealistic 
faith in the people of the world as he had with the American 
people. Here was the scholar, with pen in hand, who could re¬ 
move himself from the world of strife and drift into the un¬ 
reality of his ideals. It is good to do this, but could one 
afford to be so naive about the tone of the opinion of the 
peoples of Europe? Wilson always seemed to be at home and 
conversant with abstruse ideas.^ This association with ab¬ 
strusities often led Wilson to assume a prophetic or 
Messianic tone. This is the Wilson who matched wits in 
Paris with the adjudged leaders of Europe. 
Wilson, as President, had proven himself to be capable 
of arousing in the American people great swirls of national¬ 
ism as attested in his fiery and stirring speeches that 
moved the country from one extreme to the other - isolation 
to war. Wilson hoped that this same type of Presbyterian 
Messianic zeal would cause the people of Europe to forget 
the same inner urgings of nationalism. This Is one of the 
serious faults which may be attributed to Wilson. He let 
the momentum of the hour carry him past the point of un¬ 
realistic possibilities. Wilson was a scholar and knowl¬ 
edgeable about international affairs but he was not a 
■^Frsnk H. Simonds, Can America Stay At Home? 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1$^0), p. 35« 
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diplomat. The most unfortunate thing about this whole 
episode is that he became a defender of his Fourteen Points, 
and very rarely can one win on the defensive. Wilson was 
even forced to bargain with the Allies to get them to accept 
his Fourteen Points as the basis for negotiation. Wilson 
had made the diplomatic error of not assuming the initiative; 
his Fourteen Points were proposed too late. If he had gotten, 
in writing, a clarification of their position and what they 
expected at the beginning of the war, much of this fight 
between the Allies and Wilson would have been avoided. He 
should have gotten their assurance that they would use the 
Fourteen Points at the peace table before we agreed to enter 
the war. Wilson's belief in his own Messianic appeal led him 
to believe that he could mobilize world opinion to his cause 
in spite of the differences among the associated powers. 
Wilson underestimated the unshaken points of view of the 
Allied leaders, George and Clemenceau, in spite of vocal 
acceptance of the Fourteen Points.^- 
Wilson Appeals to the Voters 
The next mistake in a long list of many made by the 
President was his untimely appeal to the voters to give him 
2 a Democratic Congress in the off-year elections of 1918. 
This proved to be a catastrophic mistake. Again, the 
^Bailey, Lost Peace, pp. 138, 
%ew York Times, October 26, 1918, p. 1. 
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confusion of Messianic zeal with reality led the President 
awry. He failed to realize that in any political campaign, 
the people may attend rallies, listen to speeches, eat food, 
and then decide to vote for the opposition. He asked the 
American electorate to accept his judgment in selecting a 
Congress but this was in conflict with the American idea of 
individuality. In the prosecution of the war effort he had 
gotten unattuned to the ear of the public at the grass roots 
level. 
In spite of the efforts of the well financed Republi¬ 
cans, Wilson and his administration remained confident until 
the returns were in.^ The New York Times even predicted a 
2 
Democratic victory on election day. Wilson could not afford 
to be so blatantly partisan when he knew he would openly be 
castigated by the opposition. Theodore Roosevelt, with his 
old rhinoceran zeal, ripped into the President and his Four- 
3 
teen Points on October 26, 1918 at Carnegie Hall. This 
lashing of the President served notice that if a Republican 
Congress was elected it would mean a vote of no confidence 
for Wilson, 
There were many reasons why this appeal to the voters 
failed. The first reason is that most of the reform measures 
^Anne W. Lane and Louise H. Wall (eds.), The Letters 
of Franklin K, Lane, Personal and Political (Boston: Hough- 
ton Mifflin Co., 1922), p. 298. 
^November S>, 1918, p. 1. 
•^New York Times, October 28, 1918, p. 1. 
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that had swept him into office were beginning to lose their 
appeal. Since the popular ones were already a reality, the 
people lost some of the fervor of the necessity of voting 
for Wilson people. Another reason was that the catchy 
phrases were not being analyzed. Our entry into the war had 
not made "the world safe for Democracy." Large crowds still 
turned out to see the President but to the astute observer 
much of this was sheer curiosity. The last factor was that 
the President was slowly losing much of his favorable press. 
The Press wanted to know who was responsible for giving the 
2 
President advice or if he had received any advice. 
President Wilson caused irreparable damage to the Demo 
cratic Party and to the chances for the ratification of a 
League of Nations; thus, bearing out the old adage that 
"the pen is mightier than the sword." Wilson had created 
the grounds for open vehemence against him and his program 
in Congress, especially in the Senate. Therefore, the momen 
turn of the events to come were avalanched by the President - 
himself. 
The elections gave the Republicans a small majority 
3 
in both the House and the Senate. The election took on 
dire consequences later when the "Messiah" had to again go 
^Ibid., September 4» 1918, p. 1. 
^Literary Digest. July 19, 1918, pp. 1-4» 
^Selig Adler, "The Congressional Election of 1918," 
South Atlantic Quarterly, XXXVI (Fall, 1937)» 457-58. 
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to the people and found a mountain in his way - the United 
States Senate. The leaders in the Senate unleashed all of 
their pent up hostilities on Wilson and his program. Senator 
Lodge felt that Germany should pay heavy indemnities and that 
the United States should have her share.^ Senator Borah felt 
that the United States should return to a policy of iso- 
2 
lationism. 
Wilson Goes to Europe 
President Wilson made his formal announcement on 
November l8, 1918 that he would head the delegation to the 
3 
Paris Peace Conference. The error in this was that the 
President became personally involved in the making of peace. 
He should have remained in the United States and then he 
could have deliberated his decisions and changed his mind 
while notes were being exchanged by delegates. However, 
being at the scene of the conference, he had to bargain and 
he lacked the skill to bargain on the spot. 
Wilson went to Paris in spite of the advice of those 
close to him. Frank Cobb’s opinion was that: 
Instead of remaining the great arbiter of human freedom 
he becomes merely a negotiator dealing with other nego¬ 
tiators.... The President...must fight on his own ground 
and his own ground is Washington. Diplomatic Europe is 
^~New York Times, December 22, 1919, p. 1. 
2Supra, p. 4» 
^New York Times, November 19, 1919, p. 1# 12. 
all enemy soil for him.^ 
Two other expressed opinions were those of Felix 
Frankfurter and Herbert Hoover who both worked closely with 
2 
the President, Frankfurter expressed an opinion that the 
President should remain in Washington. He told Colonel 
House that he felt the diplomats of Europe could out maneuver 
the President, Hoover felt that Wilson’s “New World Idealism 
would clash seriously with the Old World concepts of the 
Allied statesmen."-^ 
To Wilson, this trip now assumed gargantuan proportions 
only he could uphold, expound and exploit his idealism. The 
President failed to realize that by going to Europe he was 
adding another coal to the fire of partisanship but he still 
could rectify this first error, Wrilson could have rectified 
his first error in the composition of his peace delegation. 
Instead of doing this he added once more to the coals of the 
partisan fire by ignoring all leaders in the Republican Party 
He assembled, with the aid of Colonel House, a group, 
not distinguished for diplomacy, and departed on December i}., 
1918 for Europe on the George Washington, The group included 
Robert Lansing, Secretary of State; Henry White, a former 
■^Seymour, op.clt., IV, 210-11, 
p 
Felix Frankfurter, Felix Frankfurter Reminisces: 
Recorded In Talks With Dr, 'Ha'rlan BT Phillips (Anchor ed.; 
New York: Doubleday & Co,, 1982), p. 10, 
3 
^Herbert Hoover, The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Co., Inc., 1958), p. 6l, 
27 
career diplomat and a Republican; his aide, Colonel House; 
Tasker H. Bliss, a career soldier; Charles Seymour, a young 
Professor of History at Yale; Charles Haskins, a notable 
scholar and Dean of the Graduate School of Harvard; Bernard 
Baruch, ex-Director of the War Industries Board; Herbert 
Hoover, ex-Food Administrator; and Walter Lippmann, youthful 
writer.^ 
Other persons were also educators like Dr. Isaiah 
Bowman, Director of the American Geographical Society; 
Professor Allyn Young, Head of the Department of Economics 
at Cornell; George Louis Beer, formerly of Columbia; Pro¬ 
fessor W. L. Westermann, Head of the History Department of 
the University of Wisconsin; R. H. Lord, Professor of History 
at Harvard; Roland B. Dixon, Professor of Ethnography at 
Harvard; Professor Clive Day, Head of Economics Department 
at Yale; W. E. Lunt, Professor of History at Haverford Col¬ 
lege; Mark Jefferson, Professor of Geography at Michigan 
State Normal School, and James Shotwell, Professor of His- 
2 
tory at Columbia. This is just a partial list of the 
delegation, but is designed to show the type of persons 
Wilson carried. 
In spite of the potentials of this group, if they had 
any, they carried with them no master plan. Wilson was full 
of ideals but what would happen when the idealist and 
^Bailey, Lost Peace, p. 93• 
2Ibid., p. 110. 
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entourage met the diplomats of Europe with their secret 
treaties and definite plans? 
The group was ridiculed by the American press even 
before leaving. William Allen White, the nationally recog¬ 
nized Editor of the Emporia (Kansas) Gazette, described them 
as "a desperate crew of college professors in hornrimmed 
glasses carrying textbooks, encyclopedias, maps, charts, 
graphs, statistics, and all sorts of literary crowbars,”^ 
The same error committed here was the same that Wilson 
made about himself; to mistake high intellect and scholarly 
zeal for diplomatic ability. The diplomat is shrewd wherein 
the intellectual is ruled too much by reason. In the game of 
diplomacy, the game is won or lost by the sheer skill of the 
player not necessarily his high I. Q,. The I. Q. helps but 
is not the only determinant. Skill develops with experience 
and this group lacked experience. 
Wilson said that he did not want to carry senators be¬ 
cause they would have to vote on the treaty when they re- 
2 
turned to the country. However, in view of the fact that 
he had broken several precedents, what was one more? He had 
inferred that this was the reason, but it was more a partisan 
venture than anything. He was going to a peace conference 
outside of the country. He had interferred in the off-year 
elections, not a precedent, but it was controversial. Why did 
1Ibld., p. 109 
p 
Baker, Life and Letters, VI, l£. 
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he choose not to take influential Republicans? He was out 
with Roosevelt and Lodge but what of the others?"** His own 
2 
aides suggested William Howard Taft and Elihu Root. These 
failures to listen were costly. 
In addition to not choosing prudently, Wilson chose to 
ignore and infuriate some of the group he carried. Secretary 
3 
Lansing was thinking of resigning. General Bliss was un¬ 
happy because disarmament was not seriously being discussed 
and the policy of the American delegation was vague. 
Versailles Treaty 
The treaty of peace known as the Versailles Treaty was 
5 
handed to the Germans to sign on May 7* 1919* The giving 
of the treaty to the Germans was exactly four years after 
the sinking of the Lusitania. Many things transpired 
between the arrival of Wilson in Prance on December 14» 
1918,^ and the moment of the receiving of the tresty by the 
Germans with the attached Covenant of the League of Nations 
as Part I. 
The first unfortunate occurrence was that it was held 
1Ibld.. p. 22. 
^Bailey, Lost Peace, p. 87. 
^Walworth, op.clt., II, 236-38. 
^Tbld.. II, 236-38. 
^Ray Stannard Baker, WTilson and World Settlement (4 
vols.j New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1922), II, 501. 
^Bailey, Lost Peace, p. 112. 
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in France and Georges Clemenceau became the Chairman, with 
a nomination by Wilson, because it was in his country. 
Clemenceau played the role to the hilt of reminding the 
assembly of the devastation of his beloved France by the 
Germans.^ It was possible to forget to be objective in the 
face of so much devastation. 
Wilson mistook the cheers of the people of Europe for 
2 
confirmation of ideals rather than simply "hail to the victor." 
The Europeans were hungry and not so much interested in 
righting future wrongs as they were in "immediately righting 
3 
their wrongs and ensuring their economic recovery." 
David Lloyd George had just received the endorsement 
of British voters in the elections of 1918.^ Clemenceau had 
received a vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies in 
c 
late December of 1918, while Wilson's party had suffered a 
disastrous defeat in the off-year elections held on November 
5, 1918. Also Theodore Roosevelt had said, "Our allies and 
our enemies...should understand that Hr. Wilson has no 
„6 
authority...to speak for the American people...." 
Another obstacle to Wilson at Paris was the fact that 
1Ibid.. pp. 121-22. 
^Bell, op.clt., pp. 278-80. 
^Hoover, op.clt., p. 71+* 
^Bailey, Lost Peace, pp. 243-44» 
^Ibld.. pp. 121-22. 
^New York Times, November 26, 1918, p. 1. 
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he had become a part of a conference that was already un- 
paralled for size and confusion. The American delegation 
alone totaled about 1300.^ The conference machinery was un- 
wieldly because of the size but became gradually workable by 
trial-and-error. 
The important council was the Supreme Council or Council 
of Ten, which consisted of two ranking delegates from Great 
Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the United States. The 
official American representatives were President Wilson and 
Secretary of State, Lansing, with Colonel House sitting in 
with no vote.^ 
The Council of Ten made mo3t of the important decisions 
but later yielded to a Council of Four. This Council was 
composed of Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando of 
Italy. However, at many sessions it was a Council of Three 
3 
with Orlando missing. 
Wilson possessed neither the aptitude for diplomacy nor 
the shrewdness to decide the fate of the world alone with two 
shrewd diplomats like George and Clemenceau. 
There were many smaller committees, inter-allied 
councils, ete., all doing a multitude of work. At one point, 
Herbert Hoover said he "made a list of more than sixty," 
■^Bailey, Lost Peace, pp. 134-35• 
2 
Hoover, op.clt., pp. 82-83. 
^Bailey, Lost Peace, p. 135. 
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"served on twenty" and was "chairman of half a dozen. 
Another thing that hampered the President was that he 
had to compromise on his Fourteen Points. The Fourteen 
Points were really too vague, too impractical, too un- 
2 
realistic and too idealistic. Most of the meanings were 
only in the mind of Wilson. What did he mean by "open 
covenants, openly arrived at" or "Freedom of the seas"? 
These terms were ambigious and could lend themselves to many 
interpretations. What of the fate of the hodge-podge of 
peoples in Europe? Could they all have autonomous develop¬ 
ment? These ideas were too hastily drafted and contained 
too many ambiguities and "loop holes"; therefore, compromise 
or even abandonment was inevitable. 
Wilson refused to abandon publicly his Fourteen Points 
but in reality he did, except for the Fourteenth. The League 
of Nations was made the first order of business at the con¬ 
ference at the insistence of Wilson. This in itself meant 
that Wilson did forsake all of his ideals for this one point. 
His idealistic principles went down the drain when he ac¬ 
cepted the harshness of the treaty in reference to Germany. 
He had said earlier that he was opposed to this type of 
harshness. 
The last factor was that Wilson had to go before the 
^Hoover, op.clt., p. 83* 
p 
See Fourteen Points, 
■^Baker, Life and Letters, VIII, 43* 
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American people and ask them to accept a treaty that he had 
not sincerely condoned in order to get the League of Nations. 
He failed to sound convincing. He knew that the Senate was 
going to fight and was already prepared not to compromise. 
He had said, "I have found that you get nothing in this world 
that is worthwhile without fighting for it."^ He had com¬ 
promised in Paris on many items and yet he returned to Ameri¬ 
ca with a closed mind on the subject of compromise. 
"^Stephen Bonsai, Unfinished Business (New York: 
Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1^44)» P» bô. 
CHAPTER III 
THE FIGHT OVER TREATY RATIFICATION 
The President Comes Home With His Covenant 
President Wilson had served as the Chairman of the 
Conference Committee to draft the Covenant of the League of 
Nations. The Conference Committee was givmthe authority 
to draft the Covenant on January 25, 1919. Wilson proudly 
presented the finished product to the General Conference 
, 1 
on February 14, 1919. The Conference approved the Cov¬ 
enant and Wilson sailed for home on board the George Washing¬ 
ton. The greatest battle of the President's career now lay 
before him in the presentation and acceptance of the League 
of Nations by the Senate and America. 
The President arrived in Boston on February 24, 1919 
and was greeted by a tumultously cheering crowd and the 
governor of Massachusetts, Calvin Coolidge. He addressed 
a packed Mechanic's Hall audience and said, "Any man who 
resists the present tides...will find himself...upon a 
shore so high and barren that it will seem...he had been 
2 separated from his human kind forever...." 
■^White, op.clt.. pp. I4.04-l+k* 
^Baker and Dodd, Public Papers, V, 439. 
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3f? 
These remarks were obviously meant for Lodge, opposition 
leader of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 
Massachusetts. Again Wilson was overwhelmed by the senti¬ 
ments of the crowd that gathered along the routes to see 
hira.^ Wilson misjudged the sentiments of the crowd, many 
had just come to see the President. There were many Irish 
or hyphenated Irish who were disgusted with the President 
2 
because of the Irish question at the peace conference. 
Before leaving Paris, Wilson had instructed his per¬ 
sonal Secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, to invite all of the 
members of the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
to a dinner conference at the White House on February 26, 
3 
1919. He wanted them to also refrain from debating on the 
League until he wss again in the United States. 
Many senators chose to ignore one or both of these re¬ 
quests from the President. Senator Borah attacked the Cov¬ 
enant on the day the President sailed from France and 
threatened to "stump” the United States in opposition to 
the treaty and the Covenant.^- 
Senator Fall announced'that he would not attend the 
^"Albert Shaw (ed.), The Messages and Papers of Woodrow 
Wilson (2 vols.; New York: The Review of Reviews, Inc., 
192577 ii, 639. 
p 
Bell, op.cit., pp. 297-98. 
■^Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After (New 
York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 194lV, P* 132. 
^New York Times. February 21, 1919, p. 1. 
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dinner at the White House. The newspapers wrote editorials 
attacking the opposition of Senators Borah, Reed, Knox, 
Lodge and Poindexter who were not allowing the President to 
explain the League of Nations.'*' 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee came to call 
on the President as planned on February 26, 1919# The 
meeting was quiet, cordial, and even had a pathetic sense 
of humor. Most of the persons at the meeting remained silent 
2 
as the President explained the League. Wilson knew that 
many in attendance came out of courtesy and would fight the 
ratification of the treaty. The stage was now set for a 
showdown between Wilson and the irreconcilables and the 
reservationists. The irreconcilables were against the 
treaty in any form; while, the reservationists wanted minor 
changes. Lodge left the meeting feeling that they had the 
President on the defensive; he attacked the Covenant vi- 
3 
olently in the Senate just two days later. 
On March 2, 1919, Senator Lodge presented to the 
Senate his ’’Round Robin," a petition with the names in 
circular fashion indicating that the thirty seven Senators 
who signed were against the Covenant in some form and would 
k 
not vote for it. 
^Ibld., February 21, 1919, p. 1. 
^Bonsai, op.clt.. pp. 59-60. 
^New York Times, March 1, 1919, p. 1. 
^"John Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., Ï9'53), pp. 353-35. 
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This was done to show that Wilson did not have the necessary 
support for his treaty to be ratified under the two thirds 
rule. All of the signees were not ',irreconcilables,f as was 
Borah but had questioned a particular section of the treaty, 
usually Article X.^ 
Wilson retaliated with his farewell speech, on March 
4, 1919, made before he sailed again for the conference in 
France. He said: 
.... When that treaty comes back...on this side you 
will find the covenant not only in it, but so many 
threads of the treaty tied to the covenant that you 
cannot dissect the covenant...without destroying the 
whole vital structure.1 2 
This threat was accepted by the Senate. 
Although many newspapers were in favor of the League, 
the people had not been heard from. The surveys represented 
small samplings of the population. In April, the Literary 
Digest conducted a survey and of 1,377 papers polled, 718 
favored, l8l opposed and 478 gave conditional answers, 
3 
These papers represented about 21,005* 792 people. The 
President was going to Europe again without a clear mandate 
from the American people. There was trouble within the dele¬ 
gation. He wanted to fire Lansing for his non-support of the 
Presidential program.^" This action would have looked bad in 
1Ibid., p. 354. 
^Baker and Dodd, Public Papers. V, 44&* 
•^Literary Digest, April 5* 1919, p. 13» 
^"Samuel F. Bemis, American Secretaries of State (10 
vols.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1929), X, 153-54• 
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the eyes of Paris so he left it for the moment. 
The second trouble spot was, the alter ego of Wilson, 
Colonel House, He accused House of giving concessions, 
especially to the French, while he was away, Mrs, Wilson 
quotes the President as saying, '’House has given away every¬ 
thing I have won before we left Paris, He has compromised 
on every side,"^ This was an extreme view but is partially 
substantiated by another source that House did indeed side 
2 
with the French on many items. Colonel House, seemingly, 
only wanted the conference to end with a peace settlement. 
Apparently the Colonel could out-bargain Wilson and this 
might have hurt Wilson’s ego. There is also the possibility 
that the President was beginning to tire from fatigue and 
strain. This theory is denied by his physician, Dr, Cary 
T, Grayson.^ 
The last obstacle of Wilson at Paris was that more 
and more the Senate debates were beginning to cast doubts 
in the minds of the American public. The public had yet to 
be presented with a final draft of the treaty, although un¬ 
official copies had appeared in the papers. By the time 
the Senate received the treaty on July 10, 1919 the sides 
were aligned as a result of the months of discussions that 
^Edith Bolling Wilson, My Memoir (Indianapolis: The 
Bobbs Merrill Co., 1939), p. 246. 
2Birdsall, op.clt., pp. 212-14. 
•^Grayson, op.clt., p. 8£. 
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had taken place. 
Lincoln Colvard, writing in The Nation.1 quoted 
George Lansbury of the London Dally Herald as saying: 
There is no honor left.... The League...is a body with¬ 
out soul...President Wilson has been beaten.... «He com¬ 
promised on essentials...he abandoned us all.,.. 
A poll of some 17,000 Protestant, Catholic and Jewish 
clergy showed that they were in favor of the treaty. Many 
3 
college straw-ballots were in favor of the League. However, 
these were isolated samplings of the American public. 
The irreconcilables of the Senate were confident that 
k 
they could defeat the treaty. They were against the treaty 
in any form and felt Wilson would not accept any reservations 
and this would cause the other senators, who were not irre¬ 
concilable, not to accept the treaty. 
The reservationists, led by Lodge, felt that Article 
X would lead us into too much European involvement. They 
objected to Article X, which read as follows: 
The members of the League undertake to preserve and 
respect as against external aggression the territorial 
integrity and existing political independence of all 
Members of the League. In case of any such aggression 
^The Nation, May 17, 1919, p. 7^3• 
2Ibld. 
^Bell, op.clt.. p. 363. 
^■MBorah the Fable-Maker,” New Republic, March 1, 1919, 
pp. 129-32. 
^W, Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated By The Senate 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), PP* 279-^3. 
the Council shall advise upon the means by which this 
obligation shall be fulfilled.1 
On July 10, 1919» the President told the Senate that 
the ratification of the Covenant was necessary to fulfill 
our obligation to the world and if we rejected it we would 
break the heart of the world. He challenged America to as¬ 
sume her new responsibility of world leadership and not to 
2 
turn back. 
After being read in the Senate for two weeks by Senator 
Lodge, the treaty went to the Foreign Relations Committee. 
Lodge announced his decision to hold a public hearing between 
Wilson and his committee at the White House on August 19, 
3 
1919. For three hours the President answered questions. 
At these hearings the President was again placed on 
the defensive when asked about the secret treaties prior to 
the peace conference. The President was questioned about 
disclosures made by W. C. Bullitt, who had been a minor 
k 
delegate to the peace conference, about the conference. 
Lodge criticized the President for accepting Article X and 
stressed the point that the League was overriding the Monroe 
Doctrine. Lodge was using the hearings to create further 
^The Independent. March 1, 1919* pp. 28-29* 
^Baker and Dodd, Public Papers, V, 5>S>0-5>5>* 
^David F. Houston, Eight Years With Wilson’s Cabinet, 
1913-1920 (2 vols.; Garden City, Hew 'York: Doubleday, Doran 
Sc Co., 1926), II, 17. 
^The Nation. August 30, 1919, pp. 28-31*.. 
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doubt in the minds of the people. 
The opposition press had a field day with the White 
House Conference. Lincoln Colvard, in an editorial, wrote: 
And after the President himself had led them for three 
hours through the mazes of psychology - after he told 
them that a moral obligation is not a legal obligation, 
and...we should be under no obligations; ...after this 
astonishing experience, the opposition members...came 
away...with a less exalted opinion of the chief executive 
and a more comfortable feeling.... 
The opposition again mustered their votes in the Senate. 
After tallying, they claimed 35 votes and this was still three 
more than was needed to defeat the measure if it came to a 
2 
vote on the floor of the Senate. 
Senator Lodge insisted that the Fourteen Reservations 
3 
proposed by him be accepted by the President. Senator 
Lodge offered reservations to the following Articles: I, V, 
VI, VIII, X, XII, XV, XVI, XXII, and XXIII.^ These reserva¬ 
tions would alter the Covenant tremendously but did not 
make it null and void as many claimed. 
The most controversial of the reservations was what 
Lodge wanted to do with Article X. This is the Lodge modi¬ 
fication: 
The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the 
^Ibld., pp. 282. 
%ew York Times, July 21, 1919, p. 1# 
^U. S. Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1919, LVIII, 803-Ô6". 
^Ruth Cranston, The Story of Woodrow Wilson (New York: 
Simon & Shuster, Inc., 1945)» pp. 392-98. 
territorial integrity or political independence of any 
other country...or to interfere in any way in contro¬ 
versies between nations...unless...the Congress... 
shall, in the exercise of full liberty of action...by 
act or joint resolution so provide. 
This was not a radical deviation but merely guaranteed 
American sovereignty in going into a world conflict. Wilson 
and Lodge could have compromised but they were both too 
stubborn. President Wilson decided that he would insist on 
Article X without any reservations, except interpretative 
ones, and this was a fateful decision,^ 
The fact that tensions between Lodge and Wilson were 
becoming increasingly deep can be evidenced by the statements 
of the two men. There'had been hard feelings since Wilson 
entered the White House. One author traces this to the time 
of the first publishing of "Cabinet Government in the United 
States" by Woodrow Wilson in the International Review that 
was edited by Lodge. Until the time Wilson came to the 
White House Lodge was "the scholar in politics" but when 
2 
Wilson came Lodge was "a scholar in Politics." 
Wilson felt that the senators did not possess the in¬ 
tellect to tell him how to negotiate the peace. He carried 
this low opinion into the Senate fight. He said that the 
Senators were "contemptible...narrow...selfish...going 
around in circles" and he had "contempt for their 
^New York Times, August 20, 1919, p. 1. 
2 
Gene Smith, When The Cheering Stopped; The Last Year3 
of Woodrow Wilson (New ïork: MorrowT l9bi>), p. t>i>. 
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intelligence. 
The President had spent the summer inviting individual 
Senators in for conferences to no avail. Senator Hitchcock, 
Wilson’s liaison man in the Senate, worked hard to get 
Wilson and the mild reservationists together, but Wilson 
would not budge. With such different points of view it 
was impossible for the groups to get together. The situa¬ 
tion was further complicated by the irreconcilables Borah, 
Reed and others who continued to work on the Senate. This 
led Wilson to use his only other alternative, according to 
him, and that was to go to the people. 
Wilson Goes to the People 
The decision to go to the people was ill-timed. 
Wilson at this time was sixty-three years of age, very 
pallor and already prone to illness. The trip was a 
caustic error plus he neither sought nor accepted the ad- 
2 
vice of his wife, doctor or close friends. The President 
had his Secretary, Tumulty, plan a western speaking tour. 
He planned to take his cause to the people. Since the heart 
of isolationism was in the West, he planned to take the ad¬ 
vice made earlier in our history by Horace Greeley and "go 
West." 
The tour was designed to avoid the Democratic South 
Alexander L. and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson 
and Colonel House (New York: The John Day Co~ 195M * P« 237• 
2 
Grayson, op.clt.. p. 96. 
44 
and Republican East. He was going to travel some ten thou¬ 
sand miles in a record-breaking, even for a young man, twenty- 
six days.^ Tumulty arranged the trip although in his opinion 
2 
Wilson was "on the verge of a nervous breakdown." 
Wilson unburdened his heart to the people on Us tour 
of the western part of the United States. The trip began 
on September 3» 1919 and ended on September 25, 1919. On 
September 6, at Kansas City, Missouri where the heat was al¬ 
ready intense at eight in the morning, he told the crowd 
that he brought back from Paris one of the greatest docu¬ 
ments in human history. He further stated that his cause 
3 
was greater than the Congress. His headache, a fact con¬ 
cealed from the press, was growing worse.^ 
Wilson continued to speak as the train hurried north. 
On September 8, 1919, the presidential party arrived in 
Omaha, Nebraska where Wilson had the train stopped beside 
5 
a cornfield so that he could sleep until morning. In 
Omaha, the President explained that before he had returned 
to Paris the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had seen 
the draft of the Covenant and made suggestions which were 
6 
incorporated into the finished document. At this point he 
•^Blum, op.clt. » pp. 209-10. 
2Ibid., p. ii-34. 
^Baker and Dodd, Public Papers, VI, 12. 
4-Grayson, op.clt., p. 97. 
^Smith, op.clt., p. 66. 
^Baker and Dodd, Public Papers. VI, 39. 
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even predicted a "world war within a generation unless... 
pains to prevent it" were taken. 
The President next visited the states of South Dakota, 
North Dakota, and Montana. At Sioux Falls, South Dakota, 
on September 8, he told the audience that, "America is the 
only Idealistic nation in the world.” After this speech he 
tried to sleep on the way to the next stop but experienced 
great difficulty. Two days later on September 10, at Bis¬ 
mark, North Dakota, he informed this audience that "men in 
despair destroy governments.""^ Later, the President walked 
in the city getting his first real exercise since leaving 
Washington. At Helena, Montana on the subject of the Covenant 
he chose to appeal to their hearts as well as their purse 
strings. He appealed to them saying, "If you are going to 
trade with them, you have got to be partners with them.”^ 
The President was gaining momentum in spite of the severity 
of his headaches. 
Finally, the President arrived at Pueblo, Colorado on 
September 25» where he stirred a deep sense of moral guilt. 
He told the group that "the facts are marching, and God is 
marching with them. You must either welcome them or sub¬ 
sequently, with humiliation, surrender to them."-* When the 
1Ibid. 
^Baker, World Settlement, II, 52. 
3Ibld.. p. 91. 
4-Baker and Dodd, Public Papers, VI, 126. 
^Ibld., p. 164. 
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President finished his speech he was crying. The train 
pulled out and stopped a short distance down the track so 
that the President could get off and stroll in the night 
air.^" The newspaper men on board did not consider this 
stroll significant but this would be the last such walk by 
the President for a long time. 
That night at the crucial point of his trip the head¬ 
aches became unbearable. The next morning the frail body 
of the President gave way and he suffered a collaspe on the 
2 
train. All that morning the severity of his headache had 
increased so that when he grew ill it was almost a total 
3 
collapse. His physician persuaded him to return to Washing¬ 
ton and give up the speaking tour. 
The President took his advice and they arrived in 
k 
Washington on September 29, 1919. The President was kept 
in seclusion which led many persons, including the press, 
to inquire about the condition of Wilson. The announcement 
was made on October 2, 1919 that the President had been 
stricken with a thrombosis.'’ 
Grayson, op.clt., p. 97. 
%ew York Times, Septenber 27, 1919, p. 1. 
3 
^Grayson, op.cit., pp. 97-99. 
^Tbld.. p. 100. 
^Ibld. 
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The Stricken President 
The League Covenant was to be debated on in the Senate 
in two months and the President was virtually isolated from 
his associates in the Senate."*' These were the days of tre¬ 
mendous decision making and the President was sorely needed. 
Through the month of October the President lay desperately 
ill with no outside visitors. It was during this period 
that Mrs. Wilson, unskilled in government matters, actually 
served as regent to the President. The term is not polite, 
but is accurate. Mrs. Wilson used her power well by deciding 
what items, persons and messages the President would see or 
2 
hear about. 
During this period the estrangement between the Presi¬ 
dent and Colonel House became permanently sealed. As one 
historian put it, "Wilson was his own executioner. He 
severed his relationship with House and condemned himself 
to death and frustration."^ 
The exclusion of outside visitors ended in early 
November with the admittance of Senator Hitchcock who ex¬ 
pressed shock In his diary at seeing the long white beard 
of the President.^ He was visiting to try and work out a 
"'•George S. Viereck, Behind the House - Wilson Break 
(New York: Prentice Hall, 1940)» p. 304» 
2 
Blum, op.clt., pp. 214-1&. 
% 
-Tiereck, Strangest Friendship, p. 292. 
^"Quoted In Smith, op.clt.. p. 114. 
4-8 
compromise between the mild reservationists and Wilson. 
The President told him to, "Let Lodge compromise!"^ 
Wilson was still unable to hold Cabinet meetings. The 
Cabinet finally met on November l8, at the request of Secre¬ 
tary Lansing. From the Cabinet room they could see the 
physical wreck of a President sitting on the South Portico. 
The glimpse of the President led the Cabinet to wonder fur¬ 
ther about his condition since they had not seen him since 
before the western trip. The only person who had seen him 
for short periods other than Mrs. Wilson and Dr. Grayson 
was his personal Secretary, Tumulty. Later the first lady 
received cabinet members in her sitting room next to that 
2 
of the President. 
The Senate Fight 
On November 19, 1919, the showdown came at 5:30 p.m. 
on the floor of the Senate. The Senate, before a packed 
gallery, was finally going to vote on the Versailles 
Treaty with the attached League of Nations Covenant. Many 
Senators were relieved because they felt that the bitter 
debates had gone on much too long. However, some Senators 
were still calling the treaty, Covenant and the President 
by vile terms. 
Senator Hitchcock pleaded a losing case in the 
1Ibld. 
2Ibid., pp. 121-25. 
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President's behalf. The first vote was whether or not to 
accept the Lodge Reservations and lost 55-39. The next 
vote was whether or not to accept the Hitchcock Reserva¬ 
tions, which were interpretative in nature, and lost by a 
vote of 50-41» Lodge, in a surprise move, called for a 
second ballot on the original vote and this time the Lodge 
Reservations lost by a vote of 51-1+1 which showed two more 
votes for Lodge. Senator Underwood moved that the treaty 
be approved without reservations and this lost by a vote 
of 53-38»1 For all practical purposes the Treaty had been 
defeated. 
Wilson and Lodge continued their fight against com¬ 
promise throughout the winter and refused to budge an inch. 
Wilson said that the final vote would be a solemn referen¬ 
dum from the people in the election of 1920. This referen¬ 
dum was an overwhelming vote for the opposition candidate, 
Warren G. Harding of Ohio. 
The President went down in defeat in a fashion worse 
than a Shakespearan tragedy. Wilson died on February 3, 
I92I4. a tired and pathetic man. He had told his physician, 
Grayson, about six weeks before his demise that, "The 
3 
machinery is worn out, I am ready.” 
U. S. Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., 
1919, LVIII, £3783-84» 
^Bernard M. Baruch. The Public Years (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart & Winston, 1980), p. 138. 
3 
Grayson, op.clt., p. 139. 
Conclusions 
The facts are now before the reader, the problem is 
now to ascertain the specific role of President Wilson i 
the rejection of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
by the United States Senate in 1919. The role of Wilson 
was a complex one that changed from time to time but in the 
background was always the idea of a League of Nations. 
The personality of the President was not the type that 
readily resigned itslef to compromise. The intuitive feel¬ 
ings of being right and then proceeding to fight for the 
cause was ever present. The lack of ability to communicate 
to those around him and to ask for advice may be considered 
another major fault. The President could carry a grudge 
and in the final analysis let it get out of hand., 
The President, perhaps from growing up in a ministe¬ 
rial family, always assumed a Messianic affinity for his 
causes. His speeches even took on prophetic overtones on 
many occasions. Wilson gave his contemporaries the opinion 
that he was a " Messiah” booming down from Mount Sinai. 
This prophetic nature led him to believe that no one could 
expound the words of the master like the master himself. 
This was a mistake in judgment. 
Wilson had a great gift of oratory but his personality 
50 
51 
held him back. Wilson, the speaker, could communicate with 
a crowded audience and have them cheering and weeping but 
the inner personality never let him communicate on a per¬ 
sonal basis. This lack of being able to communicate on a 
personal basis is the main reason why Wilson should not 
have gone to Europe. He could have done a better and more 
astute job on paper in Washington far removed from the scene 
of the negotiations. 
The President was a great leader of crusades and causes 
but when under attack he was too rigid. Wilson could lead 
us to war and to the peace table but he was no match for 
the shrewdness he encountered. Wilson was surrounded by 
good men during the war but these men were not skilled 
diplomats. The Inquiry Committee was unmatched in in¬ 
tellectual ability but they could not give Wilson the 
necessary diplomatic help he needed. 
The public had originally been attracted to Wilson 
because of his excellent analysis of the American govern¬ 
ment. Years later, the same man proved very inept in under¬ 
standing the inner workings of the same government. Only 
Wilson stood to lose in a showdown fight with the Senate 
over the Covenant which he desired so desperately to have 
ratified. Wilson blatantly disregarded the powerful men 
who could help him with his problem. He personally antag¬ 
onized Roosevelt, Elihu Root, Taft, Lodge and Lansing. 
It will be a lack of help from these men that will ultimate¬ 
ly defeat the Covenant. 
52 
Wilson failed to endear himself to Clemenceau and Lloyd 
George at the Conference, but House worked with them and 
even made some concessions. This brought House into the 
limelight and Wilson refused to share the glory of the 
moment with anyone. When House took over the limelight in 
Paris, Wilson started to castigate House. 
Wilson was a great leader in the personal sense but 
failed as a party leader. Instead of helping his party In 
the off-year elections he hurt the party with his untimely 
appeal. The off-year appeal proved to be very costly in 
the fight over the ratification of the League in the Senate. 
Normally off-year elections, while going against the party 
in power, are not so disastrous. However, this off-year 
election was fatal to Wilson and to the League of Nations 
Covenant. 
The world of 1918-1919 was not ready for the Ide¬ 
alistic type of peace or organization which was envisioned 
by Wilson and he should have realized this and compromised. 
The United States needed to become a member of the League 
of Nations first and then we could have worked out the 
details of the type of organization that Wilson desired. 
Wilson did not exhaust all of the available resources In 
his attempt to get the League Covenant ratified by the 
Senate. 
Much emphasis has been placed on the role of the 
Senate and their bitter opposition. This is understandable 
because of the precariousness of the times. No major 
53 
country wanted to leave a loop hole where some of their 
country's sovereignty could be usurped at will, certainly 
not France, Great Britain or the United States. The idea 
of collective security was new to the world in the sense 
that Wilson preached, although it had been tried before# 
A greater resting of the minds could have occurred between 
Wilson and the Senators* 
The role of Wilson is just as muddled as ever but in 
perspective he did err. He was just as responsible for the 
rejection of the League as Borah, Lodge, Reed, Brandegee, 
Knox or Roosevelt. 
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